EDUCATING TOMORROW'S VALUABLE CITIZEN

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CONTENTS

1. "What we call the beginning is often the end..." 1
   Joan N. Burstyn

2. Educating for Public and Private Life: Beyond the False Dilemma 9
   James M. Giarelli and Ellen Giarelli

3. Developing the Good Person: The Role of Local Publics 39
   Thomas Mauhs-Pugh

4. To Illuminate or Indoctrinate: Education for Participatory Democracy 59
   Jerelyn Fay Kelle

5. Subverting the Capitalist Model for Education: What Does it Mean to Educate Children to be Valuable Members of a Valuable Society? 77
   Zeua Yiamouyiannis

6. Assaulting the Last Bastions of Authoritarianism: Democratic Education Meets Classroom Discipline 93
   Barbara McEwan
Chapter 3

Developing the Good Person: The Role of Local Publics
Introduction

"Educating valuable citizens for tomorrow's society" lends itself to a multiplicity of interpretations. The task I have set myself is to lay out some necessary formal considerations of the relationship between education and the development of a "valuable" person within the context of any society, but specifically as a problem of developing personal integrity within a liberal democratic society.¹

By speaking of a "valuable member" in relation to a society, I refer to a good person in a good society. Aristotle set a useful precedent in his Politics by clarifying "that it is possible to be a good citizen without possessing the excellence which is the quality of the good man [sic]."² In a modern context, we might envision the Nazi who was valued by other Nazis as a good citizen of Germany under a Nazi government. Thus, it is important that "valuable member" be modified by "valuable society." I do not raise the issue in order to argue about the possible meanings of "citizenship" or "valuable." I mention this point for two reasons.

First, I am interested in talking about people as internally integrated beings. I do not want to focus just on some role they assume which we might refer to as "citizen." By focusing merely on the idea of a citizen, we would subordinate the individual to the condition of being judged only in relation to his or her usefulness to a larger social aggregate, without providing evaluative criteria for the society.

Secondly, although I do not wish to argue here for a particular conception of the good society, I do wish to use "society" to represent a form of social frame which we may value. I suggest some parameters within which such a valued society might exist, while I remain relatively neutral to more particular formulations of the good. I do not argue for evaluative criteria by which we can identify and judge "bad" societies.

Nevertheless, I do assume that I and the reader share an understanding of the concepts of liberalism and democracy. Philosophic liberalism might be loosely characterized by an emphasis on individual freedom from the arbitrary exercise of power and by a concern for government by law under the authority and consent of the governed. The core of liberalism is a belief that individuals have rights. The notion of essential autonomy of the individual has a history of conflicting interpretations. Individual autonomy is problematic for liberalism and is not central to liberal philosophy per se.
Democracy might be characterized by a belief that citizens have the right and should have the opportunity to participate in government. The definitions of both liberalism and democracy are formal. They do not specify the content of any particular theory or manifestation of either liberalism or democracy. Neither “rights,” nor “citizens,” nor “participation” are defined.

My intent, here, is to provide a framework within which we can better understand some implications of contemporary educational reform movements in the United States. The nub of the argument is that good people, in general, develop only within the context of communities which themselves have robust and particular conceptions of what it means to be a good person. Though I have chosen not to explicate the specific content or structure of value of a given community, each community does value certain things to which a member of that community must be loyal in order for that person to be a member. So, one of the essential ingredients of being a valuable member is loyalty.²

The Argument

Andrew Oldenquist writes, “non-caring, and alienation... seems to be caused more by the absence of expected loyalties than by the absence of ordinary moral conscientiousness.” Oldenquist suggests that being morally conscientious in a specific instance or relation requires seeing oneself as somehow attached to something integral to that circumstance. Now, Oldenquist is careful to distinguish loyalty from attachment to an ideal. To have loyalty is to be attached to a particular thing, not just some kind of thing, and to come to see it as one’s own, as “mine.” Seeing something as mine is not, however, exclusionary. Others may have the same object of loyalty. A commonality of loyalties is probably necessary, though not sufficient, to constitute a community.

Oldenquist goes on to argue that simply being mine is insufficient grounds for loyalty. The thing one is loyal to “must have features that make it worth having.” But being mine and valued are only minimum conditions. Loyalty varies in strength. To say one is loyal to one’s family is not to preclude a conflicting loyalty. A person whose strongest loyalty is to his or her family may still not deny that a “family sacrifice can be outweighed when... balanced against some great harm to be avoided (or good to be achieved) by his community or his country.”³

The strength of specific loyalties is inverse to the distance of the object from the individual. Loyalty to family and friends is greater than loyalty to a city or state, which is greater than loyalty to a country, which is greater than loyalty to the United Nations or humanity in general. The strength of loyalty requires a feeling that this is mine; attachment to anything can be precluded by feelings of alienation. One might feel more loyal to one’s own country than to one’s family, or more loyal to humanity than to one’s country. However, such attachments indicate a problem. We generally assume alienation to indicate something amiss. What is wrong with me or my family or my country that I cannot feel greater loyalty to them? Most of us detest the Hitler Youth who informed on their parents, relations, and friends.

We desire a society and circumstances in which alienation and the conflict of loyalties are minimized. That desire, I submit, is strongest for those attachments we would expect to be the strongest and closest, i.e., family, friends, a community. Such localized and particular attachments, of course, present a problem to larger aggregates of humanity. A country composed of diverse communities may well fear dissolution or disabling antagonisms if individual and group loyalty cannot be sufficiently wedded to the nation. It was just such fear of dissolution that provided the impetus behind the move in our country to scrap the Articles of Confederation in favor of a Constitution that gave the Federal government more centralized power. Alexander Hamilton responded to complaints by the anti-federalists that the federal government would interfere too strongly in local affairs:

It will always be far easier for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities... Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.⁴
In some prominent instances, Hamilton has been right. The American Civil War and resistance to federally mandated desegregation in the South both suggest the power of citizen attachment to a state. City-by-city resistance to civil rights legislation and school desegregation suggest a power of attachment to the local that resists, in many cases, state pressure. However, current state governments are barely a shadow of what they were two hundred years ago relative to the federal government in power and authority. Under the justification of protecting individual rights, the federal government has gained tremendous influence in all aspects of local government, including education, which in 1787 was not only implicitly excluded from federal purview and explicitly placed under the domain of the state, but was also generally conceived to be an even more local concern than state.

Hamilton ends his argument with the disclaimer that the principle of attachment could be “destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.” There is an implicit acknowledgement in this statement that the federal government, metaphorically representing the form of liberalism that privileges individual autonomy, is established in an oppositional vein to state government. Attachment cements the individual to the local unit, but that attachment might be broken through superior performance by the larger unit. Historically, the federal government appears largely to have achieved success in replacing attachment to the state with attachment to the national government, with some notable exceptions. However, the force of the principle of attachment to the local was destroyed less by a “better administration” by the federal government than by an actively interventionist stance practiced by the federal government backed by massive police power. The interventionist stance has been justified by claims of compelling interest in protecting the individual from the actions of states and other local governmental bodies. The federal enforcement of civil rights statutes creates a certain bond between the individual and the federal government.

The larger unit, the federal government, increasingly supersedes the power and underlines the authority of more local units of governance and social organization. Although the power and authority of the state is diminished relative to the federal unit, the state likewise diminishes the power and authority of more local units. However, a delicate balance may exist between the individual’s need for local attachment and the power of the larger unit to destroy the force of the principle of inverse attachment. The question remains whether the larger unit can fulfill all the functions of the local.

Let me recapitulate and emphasize: (1) loyalty is an important element in moral conscientiousness in action; (2) loyalty and alienation are oppositely related; and (3) loyalty to local attachments can be broken down by external and more centralized forces and successes. I believe that a person comes to see herself as a particular being through attachment to ways of being in the world that are cultivated through formal and informal educational conditions.

If one is loyal to one’s family, then one is likely to value at least some of those things that members of the family value. If the family values honesty, then one strives to be an honest person, to embody that value and make it not only “mine,” but me. The individual gains identity and integrity through developing loyalty to particular manifestations of culture, religion, and/or tradition. Attachment provides the guide for and check on action. The traditions and beliefs an individual attaches herself to, and the particular individuals that manifest those beliefs, provide the source, maintenance, and educative frame of value for the individual member. The truly alienated have no attachments. To be a good person in a good society is to be loyal to that society and to be attached to what it values.

But, the farther removed the focus of attachment, the weaker and more general the attachment is. This only becomes problematic when the more distant (which I refer to as the center, because of its attribute of commonality with reference to the diverse and particular) undercuts the more local. I may seem to have excluded this possibility by emphasizing the strength of the local. However, the center may undermine local attachments without providing an adequately robust replacement. A strictly enforced separation of church and state, for example, may eviscerate a public school’s ability to foster commitment in the young to particular social ideals and visions of personal character. If the state is to remain neutral, it cannot coherently replace, in breadth or detail, particular conceptions of the good rooted in a community of practice. If the state were to provide a robust replacement, its claims to neutrality would become less tenuous. Charges that public education provides children with instruction in the “religion” of secular humanism arise
partly from certain Christian groups who believe that attachment to their values has been undermined, and partly from a fear that the state will replace those values with its own particular and robust sense of the good. This brings us to the crux of the argument.

A fundamental component of political liberalism is its neutral stance toward particular and competing conceptions of the good. However, the liberal state is itself a player in the game. Certain illiberal conceptions of the good cannot be allowed a controlling influence in a liberal state. The liberal state is justified in intervening to prevent holders of one conception of the good from imposing their beliefs on others. The delicate balancing act of the liberal state finds its fulcrum in a minimal set of common beliefs that all included groups can subscribe to. Although more neutral than the robust belief systems it encompasses, political liberalism is not entirely neutral. When supported by the increasingly interventionist power and authority of the center, the impact of that non-neutral component may extend beyond the limits of even relative neutrality and become actively antagonistic toward the foundations of attachment necessary to sustain the identity of constituent groups.

The Hamilton quotation given above may serve as a suggestive metaphor. Liberalism is analogous to the federal government. It seeks to provide a strong but limited center that will hold together disparate groups without unduly oppressing any of them. The operational trademark is the least common denominator. The liberal society professes to respect the autonomy of its component groups, if not of each individual member. This neutral tolerance can exist only if no one conception of the good, other than the minimum which all can agree upon, gains dominance.

A formal system of public education within a liberal framework cannot exhibit partiality. It can provide the source, maintenance, and educative frame only for those minimal ideals that constitute the least common denominator of the beliefs of all the groups that compose the society. In order to maintain its neutral stance, it must be actively antagonistic, through exclusion, to the component ideals that differentiate and make particular any community of belief.

Some have argued that the exclusiveness of this neutral stance has a negative impact on the development of children’s character insofar as it separates them from attachment to communities of belief and practice. Others have argued that there is no such thing as a neutral stance in education. Education of the young always involves deep matters of belief and invokes particular conceptions of the good. In this case, the professed liberal neutrality of the state disguises a particular concentration of the good, which is inculcated in youth through the power and resources of the state.

In response to the fears of detachment or replacement mentioned above, some have argued that public education is only one component of the education of our young, and within a liberal society should legitimately refuse the burden of ensuring the holistic development of children. Formal education has only the limited role of transmitting technical knowledge and those virtues necessary for liberal-democratic citizenship. Moreover, the limited scope of public education poses no threat to local communities.

I contend, however, that, similar to Alexander Hamilton and his claims concerning the relative power between the states and the federal government, the center will prove antagonistic to the local. The center does pose a threat to particular conceptions of the good. This threat goes beyond ensuring necessary conditions for the maintenance of a liberal state. The usurpation of the local by the center might not be an educational problem if the center provided a robust conception of the good which would serve as the point of attachment necessary to develop a morally good character. By “robust” I refer to an environmental collection of models and reinforcing patterns of behavior that prescribe, proscribe, and problematize patterns of behavior, particular actions, and attitudes with a sufficient richness to provide the myriad experiences necessary for the development of moral perception, judgment, and the integrated self. A particular conception of the good is assumed.

But there are two objections. First, by definition the liberal state cannot provide such a robust conception of the good. Second, liberal conceptions of justice require the liberal state to relate to each individual and community as essentially undifferentiated from all others. Insofar as we attach ourselves to the liberal frame, we detach ourselves from all particulars inconsistent with that frame. Detached from those particulars, we may become alienated from the community that supports them. Unless we replace old attachments with new ones, we risk a personal state of anomie. The liberal frame is characterized by its minimal nature. Insofar as we can attach to it, we are attaching ourselves to a vague collectivity.
Alienation is the status of the sociopath. Attachment to a vague collectivity is an insufficiently robust context for developing the moral self. In a liberal state, the ideological traditions, myths, and rhetorical symbols are not strong enough to support a coherent collectivity over time. Without a coherent collectivity, the individual will be in a circumstance conducive to anomie. If one’s circumstances outside the school provide a strong source of particular attachment that is also minimally threatened by the antagonistically neutral context of the school, then one might better resist alienation or anomie. We might describe the same circumstance as one in which particular attachments are broadly consistent with the general attachments of the liberal frame. However, if the intervention of the center extensively detaches succeeding generations of individuals from locally particular attachments, then the basis of support for the local communities disappears.

The relationship of attachment between local communities and the schools serving their youth is pedagogically crucial. In the 1982 book, High School Achievement: Public, Catholic, and Private Schools Compared, James S. Coleman, Thomas Hoffer, and Sally Kilgore conclude that student behavior has the greatest single impact on student achievement. They further suggest that student and parent attachment to the school is crucial to good student behavior. In his 1981 Phi Delta Kappan article, “Quality and Equality in American Education: Public and Catholic Schools,” Coleman puts the case more strongly. Discipline in schools breaks down largely because of a lack of consensus about “the kind and amount of authority over their children [parents wish] to delegate to the school.” The lack of consensus creates “a crisis of authority.” Consensus is necessary in order to have effective strong academic demands and discipline. In turn, “stronger academic demands and disciplinary standards produce better achievement.” Coleman concludes that we should encourage “a pluralistic conception of education, based on ‘communities’ defined by interests, values, and educational preferences rather than residence.” In effect, he advocates creating a system of schools that are particular to the loyalties and attachments of parents and students, including their religious preferences.

In later writings, Coleman further documents the effect of robust agreement or lack of agreement among various components of a child’s world. For instance, in one article, he interprets the rise of teen suicide using Durkheim’s theory of suicide “as an indicator of the growth in their social isolation.” He goes on to argue that schools can provide opportunities, demands, and rewards, but that an intimate environment is necessary for the full development of characteristic attitudes, effort, and a conception of the self. When the relations in the school are formal and legalistic, and families are unable to make up for what the schools do not provide, then there is a drain on the social capital necessary to the development of the good person.

Coleman’s analysis is not exactly mine, but his research and arguments are suggestive of the concern I have. His primary concern is with the necessary ingredients to ensure the academic success of students. Only in his latest works does he begin to address the question of the relationship between parent and student commitment to the school, the robustness of the environment (he calls it “intimate”), and the development of good people. Although he does advocate some form of parental choice and a move toward making school environments more reflective of particular communities and more “intimate” environments, he still leans toward tinkering with the mechanics of delivering education instead of addressing the school as a necessary extension of a community.

Tinkering with the mechanics of delivery might be consistent with some version of the local control arguments that currently proliferate. Invoking community control might evoke site-based management, Chicago-style decentralized school boards, or some version of parental choice. The former two miss the concept of community I have in mind. I must stress that I do not conceive of community in geographic terms. Community involves a mutuality of relations of people to each other involving networks of shared emotional bonds or commitments to ideas, practices, and concerns. And, as opposed to favoring the privatization of education, I am more interested in revitalizing an older notion of the public which expands public beyond its currently restricted bounds. This notion of society as composed of various publics cooperating within a larger political and social frame is central to my analysis, and is true to the historical roots of our own tradition of political liberalism than is a focus on fully autonomous, atomistic individuals would be. It is also consistent with Coleman’s requirements for an intimate environment.

In The World We Created at Hamilton High, Gerald Grant proves sympathetic to Coleman’s research and arguments calling
for greater consensus in schools. However, Grant wants to get more specific and discern how an effectively robust climate can be formed in a school. He refers to that climate as the ethos of a school. Ethos is "the spirit that actuates not just manners, but moral and intellectual attitudes, practices, and ideals." In a related article, Grant argues that:

the moral order of the typical public school became increasingly legalistic and bureaucratic in its reliance on written rules within a centralized administrative hierarchy and in its formalism, impersonality, and emphasis on legal due process. [16]

That reliance on the impersonal characteristics of liberal justice came partly as a result of necessary federal intervention into the education of our children because of the gross inequities that were taking place. However, in some sense the baby may have been thrown out with the bath water. The attempt to adjust for past and present inequities through legislation further removes schools from the influence of local particularities, good and bad. As a result, a legalistic atmosphere pervades the schools. The motivating drive to excel at becoming a particular sort of person is dampened by an institutional emphasis on merely minimizing harm.

In *The World We Created at Hamilton High*, Grant concludes that a strong positive ethos is essential to a high level of academic success in schools, and "ethos depends on agreements about the means and ends of the intellectual and moral order of the school." These agreements have to be "elicited from parents, students, and teachers." Grant is ambivalent about just what is needed in order to establish conditions conducive to the development of that ethos. Generally, though, he agrees to a Colman-like endorsement for parental choice in schooling, while asserting that morality is independent of religion, and religion is neither a necessary nor sufficient justification for most basic, universal, ethical principles. Implicitly, he suggests that the moral requirements of a liberal democracy can provide a sufficiently robust frame for the education of good people. What is required is some adjustment of the delivery mechanisms, in order for education to gain the strong support of its clients.

Both Grant and Coleman want to keep public schools squarely within the domain of a general public and not release them to the control of assorted publics. The fear of factionalism and provincialism lurking in these arguments, particularly Grant's, is legitimate. The attraction of liberalism, after all, is its promise of protection from the arbitrary use of power and its impartial support of the rights of individuals. To release control of schools completely to local publics is to risk vicious forms of segregation and indoctrination. Prejudice (meant in its most general sense) is a constitutive characteristic of groups with particularized attachments and loyalties. To value something is to give it place in a system of preferences. Unless schools rely on attachment to the liberal society to provide direction, they will have no basis on which to mitigate or thwart destructive, if not evil, localized prejudices. The liberalism of society is threatened by the cultivation of too particularistic a set of attachments.

We seem to have arrived at a dilemma. Coleman et al.'s and Grant's research suggests the pedagogical necessity of strong loyalty by parents and students to their schools. The schools must reflect or gain the attachments of the parents and children if they are to be effective institutions of learning. From the same research, we learn that schools, to be effective, must engage the entire child, not just some part of her we call citizen or student. The work of Andrew Oldenquist, noted above, suggests that the attachment and engagement must be firm, robust, and particular. We also have reason to fear that local attachments may prove dangerous to, and may even undermine, attachments to the center, and that this is undesirable.

I agree with the need for a robust attachment and the fear that the center may be undermined by too particularized an attachment. I disagree that the center, the least common denominator of the liberal-democratic state, can provide a sufficiently robust environment. And, even if it could, I am unsure that it could, under central administration, achieve the necessary particularity to serve universally as a basis for the loyalty of which Oldenquist writes. Most significant, however, is the tendency to underestimate the centralizing power of the center, as Hamilton seemed to have underestimated the power of the federal government. In trying to balance the need for particularity and local control with the need
for impartial, liberal neutrality we must consider the practical effect of that centralized power.

Now let us consider the practical import of recognizing this tension between providing appropriate conditions for the development of a good person and the need for attachment to the center. A primary function of American education, if Goals 2000 and its predecessor America 2000 serve as indicators, is to transmit to our children the technical skills necessary to be competitive in a technology-based global economy. Another function, from the same sources, is to ensure that every American has the necessary skills to "exercise the rights and responsibilities of citizenship." Technical and citizenship skills are not sufficient, however. We must also "cultivate values and good character, give real meaning to right and wrong." The functions of American schooling might be reduced to the development of skilled and competitive labor, competent citizens, and members of society having good moral character, at least according to the bipartisan statements of the National Education Goals which have directed Federal education policy since 1991.

In a liberal, pluralistic society, the state has an interest in ensuring the development of good citizens, but it cannot privilege any particular conception of the good which is necessary to the development of a self-integrated, good person. Thus, the National Education Goals have implicit within them a tension between the center and the particular, between competent citizens and individuals of good moral character. They attempt to resolve that tension by advocating parental choice and increased parental involvement in schooling. Still, by emphasizing increased federal involvement in education and the nationalization of curriculum standards and testing, Goals 2000 fails to recognize or account for the impact of the center on the local. When America 2000 claims it is "time to turn things around . . . to set standards for our schools—and let teachers and principals figure out how best to meet them," (p. 4) it is either ingenuously promoting a particular conception of the good or failing to recognize the impact of centralized standards on the local. So, too, is Goals 2000, when it continues the emphasis on "setting world-class standards that set targets for: what all students should know and be able to do (content standards); and the level of performance we expect students to reach (performance standards)."

Of course, the standards referred to might be minimum in scope and consistent with liberal ideals. In which case, the National Education Goals might be seen as proposing a minimally interventionist liberal umbrella serving to maximize local control of education while ensuring the center's interest in developing good citizens. However, this is not the case. Goals 2000 is clear on this point. "Rather than just comparing students against each other or setting a minimum criterion for student performance, the National Education Goals call for performance against world-class standards." Saying what must be learned, with any degree of specificity, including how such learning is to be measured, becomes tantamount to specifying how it must be learned. If "what" and "how" are controlled by the center, what is left for control by the local?

The specific application of the National Education Goals' rhetoric illustrates part of the problem. On March 31, 1992, the Pennsylvania Senate Education Committee voted in favor of revised curriculum and graduation requirements for that state's public schools, to include proven proficiency in learning outcomes. "The outcomes focus on five goals: self-worth, information and thinking skills, learning independently and collaboratively, adaptability to change, and ethical judgment." This appeared to be an attempt to educate the whole child. As might be expected, it did not go unchallenged. The Pennsylvania Coalition for Academic Excellence, a citizens' group with ties to national Christian organizations attacked the goals as "value-oriented, attitudinal-based, [and] subjective."

As we recognize and try to address the particular and robust nature of attachment necessary for schools to both succeed academically and aid in developing good people, we must carefully work out the relationship between the center and the local. The compromise of teaching "just academics" results in either a stripped-down and anemic education incapable of securing loyalty or a potentially alienating and educationally ineffective environment where there is lack of consensus between the clients and the schools.

Many states are working on ways to accommodate greater local control. Some version of Total Quality Management seems to be attractive as a way to retain central control while taking advantage of the benefits of more localized ideas, needs, and demands. In the early 1990s, New York began to put in place A New Compact
for Learning, modelled on Total Quality Management ideas. The heart of the compact might be captured by the following statement: The state will define more precisely what is to be learned and local districts will decide how such learning is to occur."

Without examining specific practices, laws, and policies, it is hard to know exactly what is encompassed by the "what is learned" which the State retains control over and how much control the local has by influencing the "how" of education. I would guess that local influence would actually be pretty minimal under such a plan. The constraints of the center and the liberal nature of the educational institution may allow for somewhat flexible pedagogical methods but would be too constraining to allow for the realization of more robust concepts of consensus in determining the school's ethos. "What is learned," after all, is the very heart of a moral education. And as long as the school community is defined geographically and without effective alternative, then any local consensus must be a compromise of the sort that raises the ire of groups like the Pennsylvania Coalition for Academic Excellence.

Conclusion

Coleman et al.'s and Grant's research on effective learning concludes that academic excellence requires congruence between the ethos of the parents and children and the ethos of the school. Oldenquist argues for the particularity of loyalty necessary to prevent alienation and cultivate effective moral conscience. I have argued that the good person must develop within a robust environment supportive of the integrated self. Attachment to liberal virtues is insufficient to secure that robust environment. There is also an explicit contradiction between the need for attachment to particularized conceptions of the good in order to develop a good person and liberalism's commitment to both neutrality among competing conceptions of the good and intervention that effectively excludes and precludes the development of particularized attachment.

The liberal state cannot be the source of a robust educational environment. As long as the center controls the "what is to be learned" of education we must question the ability of schools to operate within those guidelines so as to establish an effective academic and moral learning environment. The control of the state and the tension between the particular and the neutral is further complicated when there is a geographically determined educational community.

There are normative and policy directions strongly implied by my argument. I have presented it in as concrete a fashion as possible because I want this argument to take place in a context in which members of this liberal democracy contemplate and act on school reform agendas. My purpose, however, is not to argue for any particular reform but only to examine what must be taken into account in any effort to educate good people in any good society. As stated above, the nub of the argument is that good people develop within the context of communities which themselves have robust and particular conceptions of what it means to be a good person. Whatever balances we strike in providing the best education we can for the people of this or any society, we must recognize that good people must be valuable members of particular publics before they can be valuable members of a broader society. In a culturally homogeneous state, the education needed to develop valuable members may differ from that needed in a pluralistic society. However, whether the aggregate political unit is homogeneous or pluralistic, attention must be paid to the need for locally particular and robust communities in which children may live and learn.

NOTES

1. "Integrity" is used here in the sense of a self-integrated person, that is, one who is or tries to be coherent in his/her self-identifying actions and intentions. The connotation is of a consistency directed toward realizing a chosen ideal vision of the self. Although honesty, dependability, and steadfastness might be components of this integrated self, they are not definitional. See, Lynn McFall, "Integrity," Ethics 98 (October 1987): 5–20.


3. Community, in this context, does not represent strictly geographic proximity or wide-flung profession-like associations of practitioners or collections of large groups of people. I have in mind something closer to Thomas Bender's idea of a "network of social relations marked by mutuality and emotional bonds." (Thomas Bender, Community and Social Change
in America, [New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978], p. 7.) There
must be an experiential component too, so, even more loosely, "community
is where community happens." (Bender, p. 8.) Thus, a church congregation,
a neighborhood, a group of co-workers, or a group of like-minded individu-
als who associate with one another might all be considered "community."
A community of nations, the medical community, and the human commu-
nity are ruled out. Community as a political administrative unit, such as
a town or current school district, might qualify, but not necessarily, and
probably not usually.


5. Ibid., p. 175. Emphasis in original.

6. Ibid., p. 178.

7. Ibid., p. 182.

8. "Publius," Federalist Number 17, in The Federalist Papers, Clinton

9. Such attachment should not be confused with dogmatic compliance.
There is room for a variety of critical positions. Perhaps the most
forceful form of critique, the charge that accepted ideals are being trampled
upon, is a sure sign of attachment.

10. See, Richard John Neuhaus, "A New Order of Religious Freedom,

11. Charges that the schools are not neutral have been most re-
cently, and forcefully, brought to light in instances of litigation over
the allegedly secular humanist nature of public education. See, Mozert v.
Hawkins County Board of Education, 827 F2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); and
Edward F. Sherman, "The Role of Religion in School Curriculum and

12. Kenneth Strike, Educational Policy and the Just Society (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1982), provides an example of those arguments
that claim a limited role for non-neutral public education. Amy Gutman,
Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pro-
vides an example of those arguments that claim no corrosive conflict be-
tween public education propagating the civic virtues of the otherwise neutral
state and more particularistic conceptions of the good.

13. See Amy Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of Liberalism," Philo-